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SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEEDINGS
IN WISCONSIN
RoBERT S. Moss
1. JURISDICTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
N 1856 in Wisconsin the provisions which are now generally con-
tained in Chapter 273 of the Wisconsin Statutes were adopted with
the intent to substitute supplementary proceedings for the relief for-
merly obtainable in equity by a creditor's bill. In a number of early
Wisconsin Supreme Court cases it was held that supplementary pro-
ceedings were intended to be a complete substitute for the creditor's
bill.' Thereafter, by Chapter 303 of the laws of 1860 then embodied in
Section 3029 of the revised statutes and later embodied in Section
273.02, the creditor's bill was restored. Chapter 541, Section 267 of the
laws of 1935 repealed 273.02. Inasmuch, however, as Section 268.16,
Subdivision 3, provides that when an execution has been returned
unsatisfied and the judgment debtor refuses to apply his property in
satisfaction of the judgment, or in the event an action is commenced
1 In re Remington, 7 Wis. 541 (643*) (1858) ; Graham v. LaCrosse, Milwaukee
R. R., 10 Wis. 403 (450*) (1860); Seymour v. Briggs, 11 Wis. 204 (197*)
(1860). See also Clark v. Bergenthal, 52 Wis. 103, 8 N.W. 865 (1881) ; Meyer
v. Reif, 215 Wis. 11, 254 N.W. 382 (1934); Joachim v. Madison Dental Clinic,
216 Wis. 261, 257 N.W. 143 (1934).
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by a creditor as in Chapter 273, a receiver may be appointed, it may be
considered that at least to that extent the provisions of Chapter 273 are
not exclusive of the right to a creditor's bill in equity under such
circumstances.
Differing from the creditor's bill which was a separate proceeding,
the supplementary proceeding is a proceeding in the action itself and
not a distinct or independent action.2 Such proceeding may be instituted
in the following instances :3
1. When an execution against property has been returned unsatis-
fied in whole or in part within five years.
2. When the officer holding the execution certifies that he is unable
to levy upon property sufficient to satisfy the judgment.
3. Where the judgment creditor by affidavit satisfies the court or
judge that the judgment debtor has property which he unlawfully
refuses to apply towards the satisfaction of a judgment.
4. When satisfactory proof by affidavit has been furnished that
there is danger of the judgment debtor leaving the State or concealing
himself and there is reason to believe that he has property which he
unjustly refuses to apply to the judgment, and in which case a war-
rant may be issued requiring the sheriff to arrest the judgment debtor
and bring him before the court or judge to answer concerning his
property.
Inasmuch as the creditor's bill was founded upon the equitable doc-
trine that the plaintiff had no adequate remedy at law, it was necessary
that there be a bona fide attempt to levy, and that where tangible, cor-
poreal property was known to the sheriff or to the judgment creditor
or his attorney, the creditor's bill would not lie,4 it therefore follows
that if there is an adequate remedy at law, the availability of the sup-
plementary proceeding does not exist. If, however, no property sub-
ject to levy under execution can be found by the sheriff, if there is
no property to levy upon known to the plaintiff or his attorney, and
if there is a bona fide attempt to levy execution, or if the execution
has not been returned unsatisfied and the sheriff has certified that he
is unable to levy upon property sufficient to satisfy the judgment, then
the judgment creditor is entitled to an order requiring the judgment
debtor to appear and be examined. This is also true when an execution
has not been issued and the plaintiff makes an affidavit referring to
specific property which is not exempt by law from execution and which
is not subject to levy, but which the debtor ought to in good conscience
2 Barker v. Dayton, 28 Wis. 367 (1871).
3 WiS. STAT. (1937) c. 273.
4 Supra note 1. Smith v. Weeks, 60 Wis. 94, 18 N.W. 778 (1884) ; Edgarton v.
Hanna, 11 Ohio St. 323 (1860).
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and in equity apply towards the satisfaction of the judgment.5 In the
case where there is danger of judgment debtor leaving, there are special
circumstances, and while no Wisconsin cases have been decided upon
that question, it is assumed that the same test which applies to the
other instances must be applied here; the additional factor of satis-
factory proof of the danger of the debtor leaving the State or conceal-
ing himself being necessary.
II. WHO MAY BE EXAMINED
Inasmuch as the statute makes no distinction as between different
types of judgment debtors, it would seem reasonable to assume that any
judgment debtor, whether it be corporation or otherwise, may be the
subject of the institution of supplementary proceedings. However, this
may not be true of a corporate judgment debtor. Apparently, at com-
mon law there existed no jurisdiction in equity to appoint a receiver
over a corporation except' for the purpose of enforcing or carrying
out other orders or decrees. For this reason it has generally been held
throughout the United States that whether or not supplementary pro-
ceedings may be maintained against a corporate judgment debtor
depends entirely upon the statutes or the practice of the jurisdiction
under which the remedy is sought.7 In some jurisdictions it has been
permitted and in others it has been denied. The New York code on
supplementary proceedings8 from which Wisconsin adopted its code
provisions as to supplementaries specifically excepted joint stock com-
panies and corporate debtors from the operation of the Act. By amend-
ment subsequent thereto the restriction was removed and as a result
the question as to whether or not a corporate debtor could be subjected
to supplementary proceedings arose, and the Court held that the
amendment did not so change the existing law so as to authorize the
appointment of a receiver over a corporation in supplementary pro-
ceedings, but that inasmuch as the statute did not differentiate or define
the words "judgment debtor," that a corporation could be examined
5 WIs. STAT. (1937) § 237.03(1). Smith v. Weeks, 60 Wis. 94, 18 N.W. 778 (1884)
was decided on this exact point and held that this provision applied specially
only in those cases where the judgment creditor wished to reach property not
liable to levy by execution such as choses in action and other rights and
interests which the defendant ought to apply towards the payment of the
judgment but which he unjustly refuses to do. It is to be noted that where
the present statute uses the word "unlawfully" the statute at that time used the
word "unjustly."
1 HIGH, RECEIVERS (2d ed.), 14a C.J. 941 § 3158. See also Adler v. Milwaukee
Patent Brick Mfg. Co., 13 Wis. 63 (57*) (1860), which is cited by authorities
as contrary to the general rule.
723 C.J. 830 § 937.
8 See Sections 292 and 294 of the Code of New York. Ballston Spa Bank v.
Marine Bank of Milwaukee, 18 Wis. 515 (490*) (1864).
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in supplementary proceedings.9 In several Wisconsin cases the Court
cited the New York law and decisions thereon with approval, but held
that a corporate debtor could not be the subject of supplementary pro-
ceedings except in an attempt to reach the property of such judgment
debtor in the hands of third persons, corporate or otherwise. Those
decisions, however, date back to the time when the New York code
excepted corporate judgment debtors.1 0 It is possible, therefore, to
argue the necessity of following the later New York decisions holding
that a corporate debtor could be examined in supplementary proceed-
ings.
III. PROCEEDINGS AFTER EXAMINATION
After appearance and examination of the judgment debtor, the
question arises as to the right of the plaintiff in and to property dis-
covered in such supplementary proceedings. If property is discovered
which is not exempt by law from execution and which is subject to
levy under execution, it would seem to follow that inasmuch as an ade-
quate remedy at law exists, the proper proceeding would be for the
court or judge to make an order preserving the status quo and restrain-
ing the judgment debtor from disposition of the property discovered
and giving the judgment creditor an opportunity to sue out a new exe-
cution, unless an execution remains in the hands of the sheriff. Such a
rule, however, cannot be stated glibly without pointing out that the
Wisconsin Supreme Court has permitted the appointment of a receiver
over tangible, corporeal, leviable personal property discovered upon
examination in supplementary proceedings, and has denied the right of
appointment of receiver in those cases where leviable real property
has been discovered.:' The latter decision, it is true, was on the basis
of protecting the plaintiff's right to redeem the property in accordance
with the provisions of the statutes. 2
On numerous occasions, however, the Wisconsin Court has looked
with approval upon rulings of other jurisdictions to the effect that
supplementary proceedings are in aid of execution and cannot relate
to tangible and visible property liable to levy, but only to money, con-
tracts, claims and choses in actions. It would seem, therefore, that
9 Boucker Contracting Co. v. Callahan Contracting Co., 218 N.Y. 321, 113 N.E.
257 (1916). See also Section 306 of New York Corporation law. That section
enumerates cases where receivers may be appointed over a corporation. Sup-
plementary proceedings are not mentioned. This section was the basis of the
New York Court's holding in this case.
' Ballston Spa Bank v. Marine Bank of Milwaukee, 18 Wis. 515 (490*) (1864);
Pierce v. Milwaukee Construction Co., 38 Wis. 253 (1875); Adler v. Milwau-
kee Patent Brick Mfg. Co., 38 Wis. 57 (1875).
31 Mieuwankamp v. Ullman, 47 Wis. 168, 2 N.W. 131 (1879).
12 Second Ward Bank v. Upman, 12 Wis. 555 (499*) (1860) where the court
said: "This would leave the debtor the time for redemption which the statute
provides... "
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better practice upon the discovery of tangible, visible property liable to
levy would require that the court or judge direct the issuance of a new
execution for the purpose of sale thereunder.
Certainly such a proceeding would not be unwieldy and would per-
haps be less burdensome financially upon the judgment debtor than the
appointment of a receiver.
From consideration of the authorities and propositions heretofore
set forth, it would seem that supplementary proceedings cannot relate
to after acquired property or future earnings, and that therefore a
receiver can not be appointed to operate a going business. However,
a receiver may be appointed to collect on contracts, leases, etc. that are
in existence at the time of the service of the supplementary order."
As a more or less practical guide an examination of the authorities
indicates that receivers have been appointed in the following enumer-
ated cases: as ancillary to an injunction to restrain the disposition of
the debtor's property; to give effect to an order in the proceedings
requiring the payment of money or delivery of property; for the pur-
pose of allowing suit to be brought to set aside alleged fraudulent
transfers; and in order to afford a remedy where an order to pay over
or deliver cannot be made because the indebtedness or title is disputed
by the third party on his examination.
Receivers have been denied in the following types of cases: to
examine claims of lien creditors and mortgagees to the property and
make recommendations to the court or judge concerning them; to take
possession of after acquired property; to collect future earnings of the
judgment debtor; where the judgment debtor is a corporation or joint
stock association.1 4
IV. POWERS AND DUTIES OF REcEIVERS
The Wisconsin Statutes as to supplementaries provide that the Court
or judge may order property of the judgment debtor not exempt from
execution to be applied to the satisfaction of the judgment, but pro-
tects the rights of third persons who may have been parties to the
proceedings by the service of a subpoena in that the Court or judge
may make no order requiring the application of the property in the
hands of such third person or the payment of money in the hand of
such third person if there is claimed by such third person an adverse
interest in the property, or if such third person denies the indebted-
ness; in such instance a receiver must be appointed to sue and recover
the property?" Therefore, if such third person admits the obligation
23 C.J. 831 § 939; 23 C.J. 834 § 943. Brown v. Hebard, 20 Wis. 344 (326*)
(1866).
2,123 C.J. 870§ 1024.
25 Paradise v. Ridenour, 211 Wis. 42, 247 N.W. 472 (1933).
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or the possession of property, the Court or judge may make an appro-
priate order either directing the payment, if it be money, in satisfac-
tion of the judgment or, if it be property, for delivery to a receiver
for sale and application of the proceeds. In any event, it may be said
that where there is property which is not money, the Court or judge
may make no order directing the third person or judgment debtor to
transfer the property directly to the plaintiff or his attorney but must
direct the turning of the property over to a receiver.'
A receiver in supplementary proceedings is not governed by the
rules or statutes relating to receivers in general, since the receiver rep-
resents only the judgment debtor, the judgment creditor at whose
instance he was appointed and such other judgment creditors as may
have caused receivership to be extended to their claims. Receivers in
other proceedings, of course, represent all creditors alike. As a result,
proceedings to appoint, title to property and such other considerations
are largely governed by either statute or by the practice in the particu-
lar jurisdiction." In New York such proceedings are governed entirely
by statute. In Wisconsin they have been more or less haphazard.
In Wisconsin under the decisions of the Supreme Court, the re-
ceiver cannot take title to real estate, but, as is generally held through-
out the United States, the receiver does take title to all the money,
credits, choses in actions, etc. and may possibly take title to other per-
sonal property which is discovered at the examination for the purposes
of collecting and liquidating. The order appointing the receiver should
not be a general order as is often the case, but should specifically refer
to the property over which the receiver is to have control. Inasmuch
as the examination may disclose property fraudulently transferred, or
the receiver after appointment may discover property covered by the
examination which has been fraudulently transferred, it is within the
scope of the powers and duties of the receiver to commence legal pro-
ceedings for the recovery of such property without specific authority
from the Court or judge. Such power to sue following the appointment
of a receiver exists where there has been a fraudulent transfer of real
estate.18 Whether or not the receiver after recovery of the property
may sell whether the property is subject to levy under execution or
not, seems doubtful if the general rules of law hereinbefore mentioned
are applied. However, in Barker v. Dayton 9 the court held that the
receiver had authority to sue and it was not necessary for him in an
action to recover land fraudulently conveyed to obtain leave of the
court before commencing his action, and that upon the recovery of the
16 Mieuwankamp v. Ullman, 47 Wis. 168, 2 N.W. 131 (1879).
7 23 C.J. 870 § 1023. Stevens v. Meriden Brittannia Co., 160 N.Y. 178, 54 N.E.
781 (1899) ; Berliner v. Kuttnen, 85 Misc. 461, 147 N.Y. Supp. 308 (1914).
18 Barker v. Dayton, 28 Wis. 367 (1871).
19 Ibid.
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property so fraudulently transferred, it being in that case real estate,
it should be sold by the receiver under order of the court.
The weight of authority is to the effect that the judgment creditor
or receiver acquires a lien upon the property of the judgment debtor
which attaches at the time of the service of the supplementary order.
The title of the receiver, therefore, to property turned over to him by
order of the court, dates back to the service of the order although the
receiver may not have been appointed for some time after that service.
Wisconsin has never passed upon this specific questionY° Recently,
however, the Circuit Court of Milwaukee County21 held, where a peti-
tion in bankruptcy had been filed more than four months after the
service of a supplementary order during the continuance of which a
receiver was appointed, that the lien of the judgment creditor had
attached at the time of the service of the supplementary order and that
the trustee in bankruptcy could not recover the property.
V. MAY A RECEIVER BE APPOINTED OVER A CORPORATE DEBTOR?
Whether or not a receiver may be appointed over the property of a
corporation in supplementary proceedings in Wisconsin is questionable.
As stated before, Wisconsin followed New York in adopting its pro-
visions for the supplementary proceedings from the New York Code.
The Supreme Court has indirectly passed upon the question of whether
or not a receiver may be appointed in supplementary proceedings by
referring to the New York Code and quoting New York cases to the
effect the supplementary proceedings are not applicable to judgments
against corporations.2 Heretofore it has been indicated that in the
Ballston Spa Bank case the court approved of the New York deci-
sions, but that that case antedated the amendment to the New York law.
The Boucker case which was decided after the amendment to the New
York law, however, followed the earlier New York cases. The reasons
given by the New York Court for its decision in that case were that
although the amendment had removed the restriction in supplementary
proceedings against joint stock companies and corporations, although
there was no definition of the word "judgment debtor," and although
therefore the proceedings applied to any judgment debtor, nevertheless,
because of the fact that the New York Corporation Law as to appoint-
ment of receivers over corporations states when a receiver may be
20 Wrede v. Clark, 132 App. Div. 293, 117 N.Y. Supp. 5 (1909). See however, Kel-
logg v. Cofler, 47 Wis. 649, 3 N.W. 433 (1879); Powers v. Hamilton Paper
Co., 60 Wis. 23, 18 N.W. 20 (1884); Woodward v. Hall, 75 Wis. 406, 44 N.W.
114 (1890) ; Bragg v. Gaynor, 85 Wis. 468, 55 N.W. 919 (1893).
21 Alexander, receiver v. Wald & Schmidt, trustee; Circuit Court Case No. 157,
341 Milwaukee County, Wisconsin.
22 Supra note 8; Supra note 9.
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appointed and does not state whether or not a receiver may be ap-
pointed over a corporation in supplementary proceedings, it must
necessarily follow that the right to appoint a receiver over a corpora-
tion in supplementary proceedings does not exist. The great weight of
authority is, therefore, in favor of the argument that a receiver may
not be appointed over a corporation in Wisconsin for the reasons above
indicated, by explaining the decision in the Boucker case, and pointing
to the fact that Chapter 286 of the Wisconsin Statutes, like the New
York Corporation Law, provides definitely for the appointment of
receivers over corporations and does not state whether or not a receiver
may be appointed over a corporation in supplementary proceedings.
In connection with this discussion it would be well to analyze the
three Wisconsin cases involved. Those cases are: the Ballston Spa
Bank v. Marine Bank of Milwaukee,. Pierce and others v. Milwaukee
Construction Co.,2 4 and Adler v. Milwaukee Patent Brick Mfg. Co.2
In the Ballston Spa Banfr case2 the proceeding was a supplemen-
tary proceeding under Section 91 of the then Chapter 134 of the revised
statutes, and was brought for the purpose of reaching property of the
bank judgment debtor in the hands of one of its officers and directors.
The Court stated as follows:
"The proceedings in which this appeal originates were insti-
tuted under Section 91 of Chapter 134 revised statutes. That
section and the preceding section 88 are identical with section
294 and 292 of the code of New York. It has therein been held
and as we think for very satisfactory reasons that the provi-
sions of Section 292 (Section 88 of our statutes) are not ap-
plicable to judgments against corporations. Hinds v. R. R. Co.,
10 How. 487, Curtois v. Harrison, 12 How. 359; .. . But as to
the applicability of Section 294 (our Section 91) to such judg-
ments there is some contrariety of opinion. In Hinds v. R. R.
Co. and Sherwood v. R. R. Co., it was held inapplicable. On the
other hand, the question has been thoroughly examined, and its
applicability to such judgments maintained in several cases. The
grounds upon which these decisions proceed accord with our
own views of the statute and we adopt them as a correct exposi-
tion."
The Section 91 referred to in that statute is similar to present
Section 273.08, and provided that by a supplementary proceeding the
judgment creditor could proceed against third persons who had prop-
erty in their hands belonging to the judgment debtor. The case, there-
fore, is authority for the proposition that supplementary proceedings
23 18 Wis. 515 (490*) (1864).
2438 Wis. 253 (1875).
2538 Wis. 57 (1875).26 Supra note 23.
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may not be commenced against a corporation unless it is for the pur-
pose of reaching property in the hands of third persons, from which
would follow that a receiver could not be appointed in supplementary
proceedings against a corporation unless it was for the purpose of
following property into the hands of third persons.
The case of Pierce v. Milwaukee Construction CoY. was similar to
the Ballston Spa Bank case in that it was an action under Chapter
303 of the laws of 1860, reviving the remedy of creditor's bill as a part
of the Chapter on supplementary proceedings. The attempt in that case
was to reach property in the hands of stockholders and third parties
belonging to the corporation. The court cited the decision in the Balls-
ton Spa Bank case with approval, noting the fact that that was a sup-
plementary proceeding, and indicated that while such a proceeding
might give an advantage to a diligent creditor who was proceeding
against a corporation by asking for the appointment of a receiver to
collect property in the hands of third persons and stockholders, that
other creditors had their remedy in that they had the right to come
into court and ask for sequestration proceedings. In that case the court
cited the case of Adler v. Milwaukee Patent Brick Mfg. Co.Y It is of
interest to note that the court specifically stated that inasmuch as the
remedy given in the nature of a creditor's bill under Chapter 303 of the
laws of 1860 did not differentiate between judgment debtors, that such
action could therefore be commenced against any judgment debtor.
In the Adler case the plaintiff had commenced an action against the
judgment debtor corporation in equity and had joined all of its stock-
holders, the judgment debtor having no assets, and had asked for the
appointment of a receiver to require the stockholders to pay in an
amount to the receiver of so much of the capital stock as would be
sufficient to pay the debt of the plaintiff and of such other creditors
who might choose to become parties to the action. The court approved
the action on general equitable principles, stating that in those jurisdic-
tions where the mode of closing up the affairs of non-paying and in-
solvent corporations and of distributing the proceeds among the credi-
tors is governed by the common law as in Wisconsin, that it was proper
to appoint a receiver for that purpose. The court pointed out that one
of the controlling reasons for the decision was the fact that the capital
of a corporation was a trust fund for the benefit of creditors and that
all creditors had the right to share therein given upon the equitable
theory that equality is justice. The fundamental distinction between this
case and the others is that while it is a proceeding to reach property in
27 38 Wis. 57 (1875).
28 18 Wis. 515 (490*) (1864).
2D38 Wis. 57 (1875).
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the hands of third persons belonging to a corporate judgment debtor,
it was nevertheless brought for the benefit of all creditors. It is, there-
fore, basis for the argument that the appointment of a receiver in sup-
plementary proceedings because of the nature of the proceeding would
not be for the benefit of all creditors and, therefore, would be in viola-
tion of the principle that equality is equity.
Certain, therefore, it is that there does exist considerable authority
for the argument that a receiver may not be appointed over a corpora-
tion in supplementary proceedings except for the purposes approved
in the Ballston Spa Bank case.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is necessity in Wisconsin for a clarfication of the principles
and practices governing supplementary proceedings. Appropriate legis-
lation such as is now in existence in the State of New York must be
enacted for the purpose of defining clearly who may be the subject
of supplementary proceedings; when a receiver may be appointed;
what are the powers and duties of a receiver; whether or not a receiver
may be appointed over a corporation; and for the purpose of making
the proceeding fit the times.
The present practice of requiring the issuance of an execution
before the institution of supplementary proceedings must be simpli-
fied. The New York Code which provides that the supplementary pro-
ceeding may be instituted after judgment and before the issuance of an
execution gives discretion to the court or judge before whom the
proceedings are instituted to order the sale of the property either by
the issuance of an execution or by the appointment of a receiver, at
all times protecting the judgment debtor's rights.
It may be well to include in such amendment a provision for equita-
ble garnishment such as is contained in the New York Code, by virtue
of which the Court or judge may make an order requiring the judg-
ment debtor to pay out of future earnings, taking into account his
statutory exemptions and the needs of his family.
